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ABSTRACT
The international community and many financial experts have singled out
the positive elements of how strong institutional reforms followingMexico’s
1995 and Turkey’s 2001 banking crisis have shielded their banking sectors to-
day from thewider economic impact of theworld financial crisis. By contrast,
this article argues from a historical materialist analytical approach that the
1995 and 2001 bank rescues and reforms preserved, renewed, and intensified
the structurally unequal social relations of power and class characteristic of
finance-led neoliberal capitalism in forms institutionally specific to Mexi-
can and Turkish society. The post-crisis reforms reinforced the dominance of
banking and finance capital in Mexico and Turkey at the expense of popular
classes and society in general, and it is this dynamic of power that explains
the resilience of banks today.
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INTRODUCTION
As late as September 2008, financial experts continued to hope that an
economic downturn in emerging markets like Mexico and Turkey might
yet be avoided despite the sub-prime volatility emanating from the US.
The situation worsened in October, however, following the collapse of the
banking giant Lehman Brothers at which point, according to International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn, theworld economy
was very close to ‘total collapse’.1 Any hope that the havoc being expe-
rienced in the US might not now spill over into a world financial crisis
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MAROIS: EMERGING MARKET BANK RESCUES
dissipated. The US, European, and the Chinese financial rescues were of
the most immediate concern. Once approved in early 2009, the Group of
Twenty (G-20) leaders and international financial institutions (IFIs) turned
their attention to the plight of emerging markets. In a February 2009 joint
statement, the IMF, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), andWorld Bank conceded that these countries would be
hardest hit in the coming year.2
The consequences of the sub-prime crisis for emerging markets like
Mexico and Turkey have been severe (IMF 2009b). International flows of
capital have slowed dramatically and world trade and industrial output
have plummeted causing unemployment to skyrocket and recession to
sink in. Yet while major banks in the US and Europe have collapsed or
required unequaled government interventions, the banks in Mexico and
Turkey – places not normally associated with financial stability – have
proven remarkably resilient. In fact, the IMF suggests the crisis will have
only a modest impact on the Mexican banks and World Bank President
Robert Zoellick believes the Turkish banking sector to be shock-proof.3
How is this possible? To be sure, Mexico and Turkey’s less advanced
security and capital markets have a lot to do with it. However, many
financial commentators also point toMexico’s 1995 andTurkey’s 2001 bank
crises and, more directly, to the reforms they believe have since insulated
the bank sectors. The banks have fared well, and post-crisis reforms are
the obvious explanation. Or so it seems. Underneath such descriptive
assessments, there remain more profound questions of who benefits and
why from the bank rescues.
The following seeks to address these relatively unexplored questions
from a historical materialist analytical framework sensitive to the social
relations of power and class. Rather than simply insulating the sectors, I
argue that the 1995 Mexican and 2001 Turkish bank rescues internalized
deeper social aspects of universalization and differentiation. Universaliza-
tion insofar as the unequal class structures of power specific to the current
phase of finance-led neoliberal capitalism are preserved, renewed, and
intensified in the rescue process. Differentiation insofar as universaliza-
tion assumes institutional forms specific to Mexican and Turkish society.
According to this interpretation, the stability of their banks today has de-
pended on states reinforcing the power of finance at the expense of popular
classes.
Following a review of the literature, I develop this argument based on
how, at the level of state, the Mexican and Turkish bank rescues have
tended to socialize bad debts and risks, rationalize the banking sector,
and internationalize the state financial apparatus according to a market-
oriented rationale. I then explore how, at the level of the competitive world
market, the bank rescues have accelerated pre-existing structural tenden-
cies towards the centralization and concentration of bank capital as well
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(Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Serve´n 2009: 45–6). In the case of Mexico, Stephen
Haber (2005: 2328) criticizes how the presidency politicizes economic pro-
cesses, which distorted the Mexican banking sector and led to the 1995
banking crisis. He believes that Mexican authorities have since moved in
the right direction, but have yet to successfully release market discipline.
There are debates within and across the liberal and institutional political
economy camps, yet there is a shared concern for crafting the right mix
of policy and institutional dynamics needed to enhance market-oriented
and capitalist developmental processes (Allegret et al., 2003). How the
social relations of power and class shape institutional changes are not
their primary concern.
The historical materialist or Marxian approach adopted here responds,
as Gerard Greenfield (2004) argues, to the need to move beyond institu-
tions and policy, without jettisoning them, to examine underlying power
relations and structures. This means looking at neoliberalism as a new
social configuration and form of rule wherein the outcomes of crises have
technical and institutional dimensions, but ones that are determined by
domestic and international political forces (Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2004: 674).
At the same time, states and societies are compelled to adjust to new com-
petitive financial imperatives associated with neoliberal capitalism (Albo,
2005). This suggests that neoliberal social rule today need also be un-
derstood as finance-led. The choices available to individuals, collectives,
and states are more forcefully subjected to the discipline of money, credit-
worthiness, and speculative pressures in the world market than in earlier
phases of capitalism (Bello, 2006). This is an expression of the reasserted
power of finance since the 1980s, wherein ‘finance’ denotes the upper
fraction of capitalist owners and their financial institutions (Dume´nil and
Le´vy, 2004: 660).
Finance-led neoliberal social rule does not mean structural determi-
nacy. Rather, through interrelated and historically specific material, insti-
tutional, spatial, and discursive dynamics finance-led neoliberalism in-
fluences, shapes, and imparts a certain social logic upon individual and
collective agencies. Cast in this light, Mexican and Turkish societies are
not understood as agentless victims of structural adjustment. As Hamza
Alavi (1982) reminds us, individual and collective agents in the periphery
must be seen in the context of class divided societies and contending do-
mestic social forces. The strength of this historical materialist account in
this way rests in its analytical capacity to contextualize human rationality
and institutions specific to Mexico and Turkey within a wider universal-
izing structural logic and sets of power relations historically specific to
capitalism. Neither individuals nor institutions nor structures are seen
as determinant relations in themselves. The post-war circumstances lead-
ing up to Mexico and Turkey’s transition to neoliberalism are explored
next.
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POST-WAR TRANSITION TO NEOLIBERALISM IN
MEXICO AND TURKEY
In the absence of the more developed capital markets seen in the US and
UK, the unique capacity of commercial banks to pool and augment scarce
money savings shaped the preeminence of banks in Mexico and Turkey’s
early financial systems. In the aftermath of the 1910–17 Mexican Revolu-
tion, the ruling elite prioritized the mobilization of capital for industrial-
ization. Consequently, the state apparatus worked to re-establish the col-
lapsed banking sector (Bennett and Sharpe, 1980: 172; Go´mez-Galvarriato
and Recio, 2003). The private domestic banks then contributed to financing
capitalist development through official reserve requirements held in the
Bank of Mexico (BdeM; Banco de Me´xico), whose funds were then chan-
neled into priority sectors. Likewise after the collapse of the Ottoman state
in 1923, the new Turkish state needed to mobilize domestic capital. At the
1923 Izmir Congress, nascent Turkish capitalists and state elites articulated
a system of state and privately owned banks that coexisted alongside mi-
nor foreign banks. The reserve requirement mechanism and the Central
Bank of Turkey (TCMB; Tu¨rkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi) helped to
fund development as in Mexico, but the Turkish state banks through their
institutionalized developmental missions also became important agents of
industrialization.
While contentious with export-oriented capitalists, this form of state
regulated banking was well-within international and American norms of
development (Helleiner, 2006). State regulation helped to ensure growth
nationally and stable profits for the banks. Tight state–market relations
institutionally crystallized between the bankers and the government. At
the time, having the banks be predominantly Mexican or Turkish, rather
than foreign-owned, went almost unquestioned. This helped Mexico and
Turkey achieve significant levels of industrialization and integration into
the world market compared to colonial times.
Be that as it may, the barriers presented by capitalist developmentmeant
that the two countries remained subordinate within the hierarchy of in-
terstate relations. State-led development had also put growing pressure
on domestic finances. By the late 1970s, Mexico and Turkey faced serious
financial and balance of payments problems that could not be overcome
easily (FitzGerald, 1985: 227; Yalman, 2002: 37–8). Domestic capital reacted
by way of investment strikes, which triggered a series of foreign exchange
and debt crises by the 1980s. In Mexico, the outgoing Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party (PRI; Partido Revolucionario Institucional) President Jose´
Lo´pez Portillo reacted by nationalizing the domestic private banks on 1
September 1982 (Tello, 1984). This, however, had the unanticipated con-
sequence of enabling a more rapid shift to neoliberalism by the incoming
Miguel de la Madrid PRI administration than may have been otherwise
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possible (Marois, 2008). In Turkey, the predominance of no single bank
ownership group meant that the control over bank capital was more dis-
persed. This reduced the likelihood of a Mexico-like bankers’ strike and
pressure to nationalize the banks as imbalances built up in the late 1970s
– if for no other reason than the Turkish state banks controlled about half
the banking sectors’ assets. Rather, mounting class conflict meant Turk-
ish state elites, backed by the 1980 military coup, intervened on behalf of
the general interests of Turkish capitalism with rapid and authoritarian
liberalizations (Savran, 2002).
Mexican and Turkish governments and financial managers, in col-
laboration with domestic and foreign capital, have since pursued
market-oriented strategies of development under the guidance of IFIs and
pressure of competitive imperatives. Yet the transition to neoliberalism
and its finance-led form has triggered a rise in financial volatility. Mexico
suffered one of the first major emerging market banking crises in 1995 and
Turkey the most recent in 2001.
The 1995 Mexican and 2001 Turkish bank crises
To explore the tendencies of banking rescues, it is necessary to first revisit
the circumstances behind the Mexican and Turkish bank crises.5 In Mex-
ico, the privatization of all 18 state banks at once – which occurred rapidly
between June 1991 and July 1992 and earned $12.27 billion – was a signifi-
cant factor leading to the 1995 crisis. Contrary to the PRI democratization
of bank capital discourse, bank privatization resulted in a highly concen-
trated bank ownership structure within Mexican financial holding groups
(Vidal, 2002: 22–5). The rapid sell-off process had also put tremendous
pressure on Mexican capitalists to buy one of the banks being sold off or
miss out. It was clear that not owning a bank would leave one in a weak
competitive position for access to finance capital within Mexico, stimulat-
ing the bidding process. Once the saleswere completed,moreover, the new
holding group owners had to findways to quickly recuperate their costs at
the same time as all the other new bank owners. Most raced to open new
branches and reduce labor costs (discussed below) and others channeled
bank credits into other areas of the group experiencing financial difficulties
– often at the expense of the holding group bank’s operations (SHCP, 1998:
48). Both intensified competitive pressures and contributed to the outbreak
of crisis in 1995.6 Yet this competitive struggle among capitalists was con-
sistent with Mexico’s new liberal development strategy that intended to
augment free market discipline. Only after the 1995 crisis did state regula-
tors point to the lack of regulation as problematic (cf.Ortiz, Martı´nez, 1993;
SHCP 1998). The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was in truth negotiated according to the perceived developmental benefits
of market discipline and capitalist self-interest. What is more, President
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Carlos Salinas negotiated NAFTA in relative isolation to ensure NAFTA
tied the hands of future governments to this neoliberal vision and because
liberalization was not welcomed by all members of society (Guille´n Romo,
2005: 89). The violent political conditions leading up to and following the
NAFTA 1 January 1994 launch testify to the contested status of NAFTA.
While bank privatization and NAFTA implementation specifically in-
fluenced the outbreak of crisis in 1995, the general conditions for crisis had
been in the making for more than a decade. Initial liberalizations since the
late 1970s, and especially capital account liberalization in 1989, had encour-
aged the expansion of domestic credit (Levy, 2003: 168). Bank privatization
cranked up this expansion that was on thewhole consumer based and sus-
tained by the domestic banks borrowing short-term foreign credits (SHCP,
1998: 10–11). It is not surprising that the privatized banks took advantage
of all the tools provided them by liberalization, including high levels of
foreign debt to feed domestic consumer debt, and that the state apparatus
enabled this to happen. Ongoing structural volatility led to the 1994 peso
devaluation that then caused the peso value of the banks’ foreign denomi-
nated debt obligations to rise abruptly. The over extension of large holding
group debt was exposed, leading the banking system into crisis by 1995
(BdeM, 1996: 1). Official accounts blame the crisis on weak state regulation
and inexperiencedMexican bankers, but thismisses the root problem.7 The
1994 peso crisis and 1995 banking crisis arose with the political decisions
to liberalize the Mexican economy since de la Madrid and with the associ-
ated accumulation strategies of domestic capital that have had to manage
increasingly high debt levels (Soederberg, 2004: 48). Rather than break-
ing with market discipline, the PRI bank rescue preserved neoliberalism’s
relations of power in a form institutionally specific to Mexico.
The 2001 Turkish banking crisis is also rooted in the political decisions
and competitive imperatives shaping its society’s transition to neoliber-
alism. Backed by the military, Turgut O¨zal’s Motherland Party (ANAP;
Anavatan Partisi; 1983–1991) spearheaded market-oriented restructuring
(Balkan and Yeldan, 2002). Once the initial export-led boom subsided after
1987, demands by domestic capital and state authorities for greater access
to foreign capital grew. More money was needed to sustain debt-led accu-
mulation strategies and to service growing state deficits. The interests of
state and domestic capital culminated in the 1989 capital account liberal-
ization decree (Akyu¨z and Boratav, 2003: 1551). This then encouraged the
internalizationof foreign currencyandTurkish lira (TL) substitutionwithin
Turkey’s alreadyunstable and inflation-prone economy.By releasingfinan-
cial forces, the ANAP government had institutionalized a situation where
it could only rollover public debt byway of costly and speculative flows of
foreign capital, much to the benefit of those who own and control money
capital. Economic instability resulted, and according to the World Bank
(2005: 1), the ‘long-predicted financial crisis finally struck’ in 1994.
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A banking crisis did not follow immediately from the 1994 Turkish crisis
as in Mexico, but the 2001 banking crisis is tightly related. For some, the
1994 crisis was not severe enough to stimulate the political will needed
to reshape Turkey as a more competitive society and avoid the 2001 crisis
(O¨nis¸, 2009: 413). For others, 1994 was an omen of deeper problems to
come, beginning with the 1989 financial opening and continuing through
to the 2001 meltdown (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). In different ways, both
point to ongoing volatility within Turkey, compounded internationally by
the 1997 Asian meltdown and 1998 Russian crisis. As only one example
of volatility, the coalition government of Bu¨lent Ecevit’s Democratic Left
Party (DSP; Demokratik Sol Parti) had pulled eight failed banks into the
Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF; Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu)
from 1997 to 1999, socializing about 8 per cent of all banking assets and
risks (World Bank, 2003: 52).
This volatility, if not immediate crisis, led to the unrolling of the IMF-
orchestrated December 1999 disinflation program whose political intent
was to better institutionalize finance-led neoliberalism in Turkey. The pro-
gram’s decision to pre-announce exchange rates (via a crawling peg) at-
tempted to encourage more stable flows of foreign capital. In the first
10 months of 2000, this sparked a net inflow of $12.5 billion (Akyu¨z and
Boratav, 2003: 1554).However, the flowswere almost entirely debt-creating
with the risks concentrated in commercial banks that borrowed in short-
term foreign currency and then lent in longer-term TL terms. This resulted
in grave credit maturity mismatches and foreign currency open positions
(BDDK, 2002).
The first wave of the crisis hit in late October 2000 as three more Turkish
banks failed. Fearing instability, money capital began to flee from Turkish
markets, which in turn pressured the government into injecting billions
into the financial sector to avoid collapse. The December 2000 IMF re-
lief package then delivered $10 billion in support, seemingly stabilizing
matters. Yet investor confidence in Turkey’s capacity to sustain its rising
public debt remained shaken. Moreover, the 2000 crisis exposed the gov-
ernment’s problematic exposure to billions of dollars in unpaid official
‘duty losses’ held in the state banks (BDDK, 2003: 10). The duty losses
were claims on the Treasury (BHM; Bas¸bakanlık Hazine Mu¨stes¸arlıgı) for
government-assigned subsidized lending and the interest accrued (TBB
2001). The claims show as state bank assets, but not as budget liabilities
(OECD, 1999: 57). State bank duty losses initially supported post-war de-
velopmental priorities. Since the 1990s, market-oriented yet cash-strapped
governments used duty losses to smooth Turkey’s debt-led neoliberal re-
structuring without visibly incurring official debt – that is, until the 2001
crisis. The final trigger to the 2001 banking crisis occurred on 19 February.
A theatrical quarrel between Prime Minister Bu¨lent Ecevit and President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer sparked nearly $5 billion in capital flight, or a quarter
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of Turkey’s $20 billion in reserves. The bank rescue that followed this crisis
and Mexico’s are explored next.
THE TENDENCIES OF NEOLIBERAL BANK RESCUES IN
MEXICO AND TURKEY
Oneway historicalmaterialist analysis distinguishes itself from liberal and
institutionalist analyses is by internalizing the social relations of power and
class specific to different phases of capitalism as underlying causal factors.
That governments have authored new policies based on fiscal austerity,
labor flexibility, privatization, financial opening, and trade liberalization
remains of vital concern. Likewise, that neoliberalism has become synony-
mous with the individualist ideology that no matter the social, political,
economic, or ecological problem, more exposure to the competitive world
market can resolve it is also of concern. Yet, analysis remains neither at
the level of institutions nor that of individuals alone, but instead seeks
an integrated understanding based in the social relations of class, capi-
tal, and state (Ollman, 1993; Poulantzas, 2000). From this perspective, the
emergence of neoliberalism since the 1980s has rested first on the defeat
of popular classes’ and organized labor’s capacity to resist structural ad-
justment at home and second on the re-asserted dominance of finance
globally (Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2001; Panitch and Gindin, 2004). While there
is evidence of aggregate growth, development under neoliberalism has
been characteristically uneven and prone to financial crises, especially for
middle-income countries (Kiely, 2007; Soederberg, 2004).
Yet financial crises have not severely delayed the consolidation of ne-
oliberal strategies, but have instead opened up new market-oriented re-
structuring possibilities once thought improbable or impossible (Cypher,
1989;Marois, 2005; O¨nis¸, 2009). The crisis-driven bank rescues inMexico and
Turkey have then institutionalized specific and bolder forms of finance-
led neoliberal social rule shaped by the universalizing pressures of world
market competitive pressures. Three interrelated tendencies illustrate how
this has been to the benefit of finance: (a) the socialization of risk and debt,
(b) the rationalization of the banking sector, and (c) the internationaliza-
tion of the financial apparatus. Governments undertake these measures
because they see them as necessary to preserve market-oriented strategies
of development.
The socialization of debt and risk
The socialization of debt and risk represents how market-oriented gov-
ernments – under structural pressure from finance and fear of economic
collapse – tend to accept ownership of and responsibility for financial
risks that have gone bad and instigated systemic crisis. Governments so-
cialize financial risks to re-invigorate finance-led capitalism. Mainstream
176
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accounts understand that the fiscal costs of crises represent transfers from
present and future taxpayers to present and future beneficiaries (Furceri
andMourougane, 2009: 28). Yet they ignore how rescues re-institutionalize
structurally unequal relations of power between finance (the beneficiaries)
and the laboring classes (the taxpayers).
In Mexico as the 1995 banking crisis unfolded, the Ernesto Zedillo PRI
government coordinated its response through the BdeM and the Banking
Fund for the Protection of Savings (Fobaproa; Fondo Bancario de Pro-
teccio´n al Ahorro). Because the funds collected by Fobaproa to date fell
short, the PRI absorbed the cost of rescue into the Executive budget with-
out public consultation (SHCP, 1998: 33). At the time, the PRI claimed the
rescuewould cost about 5.5 per cent of 1995 gross domestic product (GDP)
(BdeM, 1996: 8). In national discourse, the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit (SHCP; Secretarı´a de Hacienda y Cre´dito Pu´blico) framed the bank
rescue not as saving a few private bankers, but as necessary for the benefit
of all Mexicans (SHCP, 1998: 21).
The first actions taken involved injecting immediate US dollar liquidity
into the troubledMexican banks and a Temporary Capitalization Program
(Procapte) to help failing banks reach an 8 per cent capital to asset ratio
(SHCP, 1998: 34–5; BdeM, 1998: 156). The political intent was to restore im-
mediate social confidence in the banks. Another program aimed to stretch
out and restructure the individual debts of fisheries, families, small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and so on (SHCP, 1998: 35; OECD, 2002:
155). Rising interest rates and falling personal incomesmeant this program
was practically ineffectual for the average debtor (Avalos and Trillo, 2006:
25), yet the goal of encouraging individuals to collectively honor their
debts to the banks is clear. The most substantial socialization measure,
however, involved the PRI intervening directly in the interests of finance
through the permanent recapitalization program. The state absorbed the
banks’ bad debts with 10-year bonds that were non-negotiable and capital-
izable every three months (SHCP, 1998: 38; OECD, 2002: 155). The bankers
accepted the state bonds, and theMexican public’s capacity to honor them.
By early 1998, the cost of socialization had grown to $60 billion or around
15 per cent of 1998 GDP – five times the $12 billion received for bank pri-
vatization just a few years earlier. The PRI recognized Fobaproa could not
independently redeem the 1995 bonds as they became due, thus threaten-
ing economic stability. This prompted President Zedillo to ask Congress
to officially absorb all Fobaproa debt in March 1998 (SHCP, 1998: 51–2).
In a society rocked by the post-NAFTA Zapatista uprising, lingering fury
over the first bailout, growing levels of poverty, ongoing government cor-
ruption, and the recent December 1997 peasant massacre in Acteal, this
unleashed a political maelstrom. The PRI no longer enjoyed the political
dominance it once had in Congress. The Party of the Democratic Revolu-
tion (PRD; Partido de la Revolucio´n Democra´tica) had also obtained the
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names of Fobaproa beneficiaries whowould again benefit from the Zedillo
plan. A few were among Latin America’s billionaires. Many others were
generous PRI contributors (Rosen 1998). Nine months of political debate
and public outcry ensued. In December 1998, the PRI pulled together a
deal with the National Action Party (PAN; Partido Accio´n Nacional) and
pushed through a modified debt socialization plan. The costs of servic-
ing the debt would be included in Mexico’s annual budget, a measure
only made possible by diverting tax revenues away from social spending
(Stallings, 2006: 190).
Ten years on, the IMF (2006: 28) has expressed concern over the $100
billion in accrued debt (nearly 20 per cent of GDP). In negotiationswith the
nowmajority foreign-ownedbanks, the government has allowed the banks
to exchange the old bonds for newfinancial instruments (Mannsberger and
McBride, 2007: 327).However, popular discontent has not subsided against
either the PRI or the PAN evidenced in part by a collective of bankworkers
that supported the PRD candidate – under the banner of ‘Bancarios por
Lo´pez Obrador’ (Bank Workers for Lo´pez Obrador) – during the 2006
presidential elections.
In Turkey following the February 2001 crisis, the Ecevit DSP coalition –
held together more by the dire economic circumstances than by any po-
litical affinities – named longtime World Bank executive, Kemal Dervis¸,
as the new Minister of the Economy to help organize the 2001 bank res-
cue. The coalition gave Dervis¸ broad powers to do so, including control
over the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK; Bankacılık
Du¨zenleme veDenetlemeKurumu). BymidApril, he announced the Tran-
sition to a Strong Economy (TSE) program designed to renew Turkey’s
openness to the world market. At the heart of the TSE rested the May 2001
Banking Sector Restructuring Program (BSRP) to be carried out through
the BDDK. Dervis¸ portrayed the BSRP in national discourse as capable
of eliminating financial distortions and as promoting an efficient, globally
competitive, and stable banking sector (BDDK 2002). This first meant so-
cializing the vast amounts of risky debt and duty losses held by the banks
in Turkey.
The DSP coalition had already transferred $6.1 billion from the BHM
to the TMSF in October 2000 to cover the already failed banks (OECD,
2001: 206; World Bank, 2003: 52). This included over $2 billion in support
for foreign banks. As the 2001 crisis unfolded, the DSP disregarded the
legislated deposit coverage limits established in June 2000 and accepted
responsibility for 100 per cent of the losses ‘with the purpose of protecting
the banking system’ (BDDK, 2003: 20). The final rescue tally amounted
to $47.2 billion – or just over 30 per cent of 2002 GDP (BDDK, 2003: 6).8
Nearly $22 billion liquidated the state banks’ duty losses and the other
$25 billion covered the failed private banks. The Turkish public undertook
responsibility for $44.5 billion of this and the private banks $2.7 billion.
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The socialization of bad debt and risk represents an initial, compelling,
and necessary political step to rescue the banks if and only if the PRI and
DSP wanted to remain within the confines of market-oriented capitalist
development. By managing this risk at home, state financial authorities
contributed to managing the competitive world market.
The rationalization of the banking sector
In the rescue process, state authorities also tended to take responsibility
for rationalizing the banking sector in line with neoliberal developmental
strategies.While seemingly at oddswith the principle, state intervention is
meant to upgrade the market-oriented organization of the banks. In Mex-
ico and Turkey, this has involved IFI-mediated and government-authored
regulatory changes, forced mergers, bank takeovers, and the internaliza-
tion of foreign bank capital.
The Dervis¸ BSRP policy response to the 2001 Turkish crisis included
more restrictive bank regulatory and supervisory measures meant to sta-
bilize market-oriented finance. The IMF had taken the lead in propos-
ing the reforms but – according to Faik O¨ztrak,9 a Cumkuriet Halk Par-
tisi; Rebulican People’s Party (CHP) member of parliament, former Sub-
secretary of the BHM, and architect of the 2001 crisis restructuring plan
alongside Dervis¸ – the reforms were not imposed but prepared by the
Turkish bureaucracy, even though it is in the interests of Turkish politi-
cians to suggest otherwise. The DSP measures involved amending the
1999 Banking Law to impose tougher capital requirements, stricter credit
limits, larger non-performing loan provisions, and so on (BDDK, 2001).
New merger and acquisition tax incentives aimed to reduce the number
of banks (BDDK, 2003: 66). Corporate and tax legislation reorganized once
combined financial–industrial groups into separated financial and corpo-
rate conglomerates. The rules around related-lending and associated loan
limits were stiffened. These legal changes forced Turkish holding groups
to pursue banking as a separate business in its own right.10 The BSRP also
encouraged the entry of foreign bank capital via higher liquidity and cap-
ital adequacy requirements, and thus the formation of domestic–foreign
joint banking ventures (the Basel accords discussed below). In a banking
systemwith low liquidity, the policy compelled domestic banks to seek out
foreign capital.
The 2001 crisis also provided an opportunity for the DSP to rapidly
restructure the state banks according to a market-oriented logic. The coali-
tion annulled nearly 100 regulations and, in doing so, arrested the possi-
bility of any future political channeling of state bank resources, be they
developmental or neoliberal in orientation. The coalition then merged the
state-owned Emlak Bank into Ziraat Bank as the BDDK re-crafted the
three remaining state bank operations in line with profit imperatives. State
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bank managers have since pursued European Union (EU) harmonization
in preparation for eventual privatization.
The 1995 Mexican rationalization process has striking similarities. As
in Turkey, financial policy changes re-articulated how Mexican banks op-
erated within the competitive world market by way of new supervision
requirements, bank regulations, capital adequacy, and limited deposit pro-
tections (SHCP, 1998). State-led rationalization likewise re-organized the
banks. From 1995 to 1997, Fobaproa took over 13 mostly smaller failed
banks, then closed and/or re-sold them to other domestic or foreign banks.
The PRI also viewed the entry of foreign bank capital favorably. In Febru-
ary 1995, Zedillo modified the 1990 Credit Institutions Law to encour-
age domestic–foreign alliances. According to the BdeM (1996: 133, 230–5),
foreign capital would help improve systemic efficiency, restore stability,
and increase the banking sector’s capital base. The changes enabled for-
eign investors to take majority control of all but the three largest banks
(Tschoegl, 2004: 59). Lingering restrictions and ongoing economic instabil-
ity slowed foreign interest until all ownership barriers were removed in
1999, releasing a flood of foreign bank capital into Mexico.
The tendency towards post-banking crisis rationalization is tantamount
to the government putting its ‘house in order’, towhich theGovernor of the
TCMB, Durmus¸ Yılmaz (2007), plainly alludes. In bothMexico and Turkey,
this ‘order’ has meant the restructuring of the banking sector around fi-
nancial imperatives in a manner consistent with their state’s subordinate
positions within the world market.
The internationalization of the state’s financial apparatus
The internationalization of the state’s financial apparatus is the third ten-
dency, and it has a dual character. On the one hand, internationalization
involves government elites and state managers accepting responsibility
for managing their own domestic capitalist order in such a way that they
also contribute to protecting the international capitalist order (Panitch and
Gindin, 2003: 17). On the other hand, internationalization involves these
same actors insulating the state’s financial apparatus from domestic poli-
tics according to international norms. The sine qua non of policy credibility
and internationalization today, for example, involves central bank inde-
pendence and inflation targeting (Mishkin, 2009).
Internationalization in Mexico took firmer root with the 1994 NAFTA,
and has accelerated since the 1995 banking crisis. In the lead up toNAFTA,
the PRI had already granted the BdeM independence. Then in response
to the 1995 crisis, the PRI merged the once separate National Securities
and National Banking commissions into one – the National Banking and
Securities Commission (CNBV; Comisio´n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores)
to set the banking sector on a better footing at home and in relation to
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the world market (BdeM, 1996: 133). Zedillo granted the CNBV greater
independence in his 1998 reforms, which fell short of full autonomy. The
government also granted the CNBV greater powers to liaison with foreign
regulators, whose relations are formalized in joint international Memo-
randums of Understanding (MU) (IMF, 2007a: 15). The 1998 reforms also
replaced Fobaproa with a new bankers’ fund responsible for insuring for-
eign and domestic banks alike – the Bank Savings Protection Institute
(IPAB; Instituto para la Proteccio´n al Ahorro Bancario) (BdeM, 1999: 232).
As the 1995 crisis settled out and foreign ownership restrictions disap-
peared in 1999, there was a far greater need to bring banking regulations
within international norms, according to a high-ranking SHCP director.11
The Vicente FoxPAN government responded in its National Development
Finance Program (2002–06), which pursued compliance with the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) Basel 25 core banking principles (IMF,
2006). The current PAN President Felipe Caldero´n’s 2007–12 National De-
velopment Plan (NDP) continues to institutionally privilege financial sta-
bility by enhancing the protection of property rights, promoting financial
competition, and enhancing state financial regulation.
The Turkish government’s 2001 bank rescue was also shaped by a form
of internationalization committed to an order that, in the words of Dervis¸,
separates ‘the economic from thepolitical’ (in TBB, June 2001; also seeCizre
and Yeldan, 2005: 390). As one response to the 2001 crisis, the DSP coalition
granted the TCMB formal independence (Yılmaz, 2007: 3). The coalition
then augmented the autonomy and regulatory power of the BDDK and
the TMSF (BDDK, 2001). The BDDK has assumed responsibility for ne-
gotiating international MUs that formalize relations between the BDDK
and other foreign bank supervisory agencies like Mexico’s CNBV (BDDK,
2003: 68–9). The BDDK also has the important task of analyzing and imple-
menting the Basel II accords intended to bring Turkish risk management
and capital adequacy standards in line with international norms (TBB,
2005: 23).12
Upon coming to power in 2002 and at the headwaters of an economic
expansionary phase, the Justice and Development Party (AKP; Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi) enhanced TCMB independence. The AKP did so by
bringing its structures and duties closer to international standards and,
most significantly, by legislating price stability and inflation-targeting as
TCMB imperatives (TBB, 2005: 25). The TCMB can no longer undertake
any initiative that interferes with these imperatives.13 At the same time,
Turkey’s commitment to the EU Customs Union and ongoing accession
talks form the touchstone of domestic financial policy formation, accord-
ing to Ersin O¨zince (2005), chair of the Banks Association of Turkey (TBB;
Tu¨rkiye Bankalar Birlig˘i). The 2005 Bank Law was framed with EU acces-
sion inmind, whichwas presented as an opportunity to strengthen institu-
tional capacity through internationalization (BDDK, 2006). Most banking
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activities today are harmonized with market-oriented EU directives and
international best practices (TBB, 2007: I-8).
While credible in the eyes of liberal political economy, international-
ization tends to institutionalize firewalls between (a) the flows of money
in a society and the financial apparatus and (b) the public’s influence
over these. Whether you refer to this process as de-politicization (La Porta
et al., 2002) or as establishing external policy anchors (O¨nis¸, 2006), inter-
nationalization militates against public representation shaping the actions
of finance (Grabel, 2000: 7). Furthermore, internationalization has shaped
a more robust financial apparatus more capable of managing finance-led
accumulation, contrary to ‘hollowed out’ accounts of the neoliberal state.
Socialization, rationalization, and internationalization are constitu-
tive of the Mexican and Turkish institutionalized form of finance-led
neoliberalism. While the weaknesses of individual banks are exposed,
the strength of finance in society is revealed: the financial risks specific to
the current phase of capital accumulation that drive recurrent crises have
become the collective responsibility of present and future generations of
Mexicans and Turks. Yet popular sectors have been unable to penetrate
the bank rescue and reform process.
THE TENDENCIES OF BANK CAPITAL IN MEXICO AND
TURKEY
The tendencies of bank rescues seen above occurwithin the structure of the
world market wherein individual banks coexist and compete. In contrast
to liberal frameworks that see the world market as a timeless economic
sphere of individual competition and redistributive justice (Vanberg, 2005),
theworldmarket is here defined as a real abstraction that has emerged his-
torically in the context of capitalism and is composed of universal flows
of money, credit, and capital and therefore of unequal and exploitative
sets of class-based social relations of power. As Oliver Nachtwey and To-
bias ten Brink (2008: 45) write on the world market, ‘The form of value
(money, capital) and the law of value (the market) impose a particular
logic upon people and make a particular form of rationality plausible to
them – a pressure that takes effect behind the backs of the subjects.’ In
the cases of Mexico and Turkey, bank capital has historically tended to-
wards what Marxists argue are structural features of capitalism, namely
(a) the centralization and concentration of capital and (b) the intensifica-
tion of competitive imperatives (cf. Sweezy, 1970: 254–62), and these often
accelerate following periods of crisis.
The centralization and concentration of bank capital
The centralization of bank capital is a historical–structural process of com-
bining pre-existing but separate banking institutions through such things
182
Do
wn
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
SO
AS
 L
ib
ra
ry
] 
At
: 
09
:5
0 
14
 J
un
e 
20
11
MAROIS: EMERGING MARKET BANK RESCUES
as mergers and the formation of holding groups. Centralization is driven
by world market competition and enabled by the availability of credit
(Marx, 1990: 776–80). The process can occur rapidly and result in more
powerful combinations of bank capital. The concentration of bank capital is
related but distinct, and it refers to how the accumulated quantity of capital
controlled by a single bank tends to become greater with time. The greater
the concentration of capital, the larger the possible scale of activity aimed
at increasing the amount of accumulated capital. However, because capi-
tal is conceived not simply as a thing or input as in neoclassical economic
theory but as an unequal social relation of power between capital and la-
bor, the greater the concentration of capital the greater the power of those
who own and control it within capitalist society. In the case of banking,
there is a dual character to the concentration of capital. On the one hand,
concentration occurs at the level of ownership group, including state, pri-
vate domestic and foreign bank ownership. On the other hand, concen-
tration occurs at the level of individual banks. While centralization and
concentration are structural tendencies, contingent counter-tendencies –
such as domestic political realities and economic crises – can offset, re-
verse, or intensify them depending on the circumstances.
In post-war Turkey, many small private banks were established early on
and failed. More stable state-owned and larger domestic banks emerged
later alongside smaller foreign banks such that by the 1960s there were
about 50 banking institutions (BYEGM, 2005; TBB, 1964). State regulations
then promoted the centralization of smaller private banks into the larger
Turkish holding groups to augment domestic credit availability for
industrialization. By 1980, the number of banks had fallen to 39 (TBB,
1981). Financial liberalization during the 1980s subsequently encouraged
banking de-centralization and numbers increased to 62 by 1999 (TBB,
1981–2000). Nevertheless, the large Turkish holding groups had already
begun acquiring control overmost of the private banks (Isık andAkc¸aog˘lu,
2006: 5; Ercan, 2002: 30). As in Mexico, holding groups with banks at the
core of operations gained an exceptional competitive advantage because
they could more easily access credit and channel bank profits into the
group’s wider activities (O¨ncu¨ and Go¨kc¸e, 1991: 106; OECD, 1999: 126–7;
Ercan and Oguz, 2007: 181). In the public sector, state managers actively
centralized the capital of state-owned banks so they could also better re-
spond to the demands of capital: from 1980 to 1999, 11 state banks became
four – Ziraat, Halk, Vakif, and Emlak – through minor privatizations,
mergers, and closures (TBB 1964–2000). Following the 2001 banking crisis,
government policy again drew on centralization as a tool of economic
stabilization. By way of mergers, failures, and state rescues, bank numbers
dropped from 62 to 33 between 1999 and 2006 – all of which were private
banks except for Emlak Bank (TBB, 2000; TBB, 2007: I-35). The 2001 bank
rescue did not change the fact that holding groups owned most the banks,
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but tighter regulation and foreign bank partnerships erected stronger
firewalls between the core holding group and its banking operations.
The concentration of capital in Turkish private banks has grown along-
side centralization. Since 1923, private domestic, foreign, and state-owned
banks have co-existed. By the mid 1960s, the state banks had gained con-
trol of about 64 per cent of all bank assets, private domestic 27 per cent,
and foreign 4 per cent (TBB, 1999). By the late 1990s, state bank assets had
contracted to about 39 per cent as private domestic bank assets expanded
to just above 50 per cent. Foreign control remained stagnant around 3.5 per
cent, but with the prospect of EU accession since 2004, it began to swell.
Whereas in 2005 foreign banks controlled just 5 per cent of the sector, this
more than doubled to 12 per cent by 2006 and climbed again to 15 per cent
presently (TBB, 2007L I-39; 2009: I-41). Estimates that include minority
foreign-held shares in the Istanbul Stock Exchange suggest foreign own-
ership is now over 35 per cent.
The concentration of capital within individual banks has also tended to
increase, especially since 2001. By the early 1990s, the five largest banks
controlled 54 per cent of all banking assets and the top 10 banks 75 per cent.
Liberalization through the 1990s, however, nurtured de-concentration for
a time: the top five banks controlled just 46 per cent of assets and the top 10
68 per cent by 1999 (TBB, 2000). This reversed after 2001 only to supersede
1990 levels. Within a year, the top five controlled 58 per cent and the top 10
81 per cent of all assets. Presently, the top five banks control 62 per cent and
the top 10 86 per cent (TBB, 2009: I-41). Interestingly, the state banks remain
within the top 10 and continue to control about a third of banking assets.
In the case of Mexico, the number of post-war banking institutions bal-
looned from less than 40 to 105 from 1940 to 1971 (Ba´tiz-Lazo and Del
Angel, 2003: 344; Aubey, 1971: 26). The large quantity should not obscure
howmost financial institutions had become centralized within large Mex-
ican holding groups. By the mid-1960s, six groups owned 44 commercial
banks and 21 financieras (investment-type banks) (Aubey, 1971: 26). The
holding groups used their banks’ savings to channel resources into their
non-bank affiliates and to boost their market power, much as in Turkey
(Del A´ngel-Mobarak, 2005: 46). Following the near collapse of the sector in
1982 and bank nationalization, the de la Madrid PRI government central-
ized the existing 58 nationalized banks into 18 by 1986 and organized them
along local, regional, and national lines to promote stability and respond to
the demands of capital. Following the 1991–92 bank privatizations, how-
ever, the number of banks again mushroomed to 41 by the time the 1995
banking crisis hit. These then fell to 36 by 2000 and to 31 by 2006 due
to banking failures, mergers, and the reticence of Mexican authorities to
grant new banking licenses (CNBV, 2001–2008).
Prior to the 1995 banking crisis, bank capital was almost wholly con-
centrated in the hands of Mexicans (including state ownership from 1982
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to 1992). Shortly thereafter an initial break in Mexican control occurred.
Just over $1 billion in foreign bank capital entered from Spain, Canada, the
UK, and the US over the next four years. However, with the removal of all
foreign ownership restrictions in 1999 – over and above what had been ne-
gotiated in the 1994 NAFTA Chapter 14 appendices – foreign banks were
poised to assume control in the new millennium. Between 2000 and 2002,
just over $20 billion in foreign bank capital entered. Whereas Citibank had
been the lone foreign bank in Mexico since 1929, there were 18 foreign and
18 private domestic banks by 2002 (OECD, 2004: 310). Mexico today has
among the highest concentrations of bank capital under foreign control in
Latin America, sitting around 85 per cent.14
Bank capital concentration is also evident in how most banks are con-
trolled within a few powerful financial groups (BdeM, 2007: 79, 83).
Whereas six Mexican financial groups informally controlled about 73 per
cent of all financial sector resources in the mid-1960s – including many
dozens of separate banks and other financial institutions – nearly 97 per
cent of all bank capital and 84 per cent of all mutual fund assets are concen-
trated within formally incorporated financial groups today (Aubey, 1971:
26; BdeM, 2007: 50). The six largest groups control over 85 per cent of
all bank assets (BdeM, 2007: 51). The largest bank, Spanish-owned BBVA
Bancomer, controls over 27 per cent of bank assets, the top two banks,
which includes the US-owned Citibank-Banamex, control 44 per cent of all
private sector credits and 60 per cent of all mortgages (CNBV, 2008: 43).
As universal banks, their operations have spread to virtually all aspects of
finance (IMF, 2007a). The monopolistic position of foreign banking giants
have raised concerns within the Caldero´n administration, whose 2007–12
NDP encourages market-based solutions to diffuse bank concentration,
and within the IMF (2009a), which has raised red flags over the possible
impact of foreign affiliate failure owing to the 2008–09 financial crisis.
In Mexico and Turkey, bank centralization and concentration have
tended towards the greater private and foreign control of bank capital
that is concentrated in larger and fewer institutions. In consequence, fi-
nance has gained a stronger position of power in society. This too has led
to more intense competitive imperatives.
The intensification of competitive banking imperatives
Intensification refers to a structural acceleration in the competitive im-
peratives acting upon bank institutions and workers, individually and
collectively. In the post-war period, intensification typically involved the
extension of multi-branch banking in Mexico and Turkey, but government
policy also mitigated intensification pressures to protect bank profitabil-
ity and domestic stability. This state-led model of banking came under
material and ideological pressure in the late 1970s, however, as a form
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of so-called financial repression (Shaw, 1973; McKinnon, 1973). With the
transition to neoliberalism, liberal political economists have celebrated in-
tensification as the triumph of market-discipline and egoistic individual
choices, which result in themost just form of allocating society’s resources.
Institutional political economists have likewise encouraged intensification
so long as it follows the right sequencing of events and builds the insti-
tutions necessary to promote virtuous investment cycles and a more eq-
uitable distributional compromise between capital and labor (O¨nis¸, 2009).
By contrast, I focus on the ways in which intensification is experienced in
the lives of people and their communities – through bank jobs, produc-
tivity demands, profit imperatives, and so on – that has been more often
overlooked.15
In the case of Turkey, the ratio of bank assets to gross national product
more thandoubled from31 to 80per cent from1980 to 2000 (TBB, 2000). The
number of foreign, state, and private domestic bank branches, however,
remained practically flat. Among the private banks, moreover, employee
numbers increased by less than 5 per cent, and this is despite overcoming
the state banks in overall asset control (shown above). Fewer workers han-
dling more bank capital helped to drive productivity gains and contribute
to the more than doubling of the private banks’ return on assets (ROA)
profit ratios, which grew from about 1 per cent before the 1980s to over
2 per cent by the late 1990s (TBB, 1999).16 In response to Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal’s liberalization efforts, the Turkish private banks also turned
to leveraging more capital to earn higher (and riskier) returns on equity
(ROE) profits (this too was a prime factor leading to de-centralization via
new entries into themarket). ROE grew from about 35 per cent before 1980
to just over 60 per cent in the late 1990s (TBB, 2000).Whereas a bank’s ROA
is the fundamental measure of its core situation, ROE showswhat happens
when owners leverage a bank’s fundamentals by taking on debt. If ROA
is falling and ROE increasing, then a bank is likely headed for problems.
The culmination of leveraged and high risk bank returns amidst domes-
tic political and economic instability and open capital accounts contributed
to the 2001 bank crisis and the collapse of many banks. As noted, the 2001
BSRP, among other measures, imposed higher reserve requirements in re-
sponse. This enabled Turkey to keep its neoliberal development strategy
alive, but one modified by crisis. ROE fell to about 14 per cent by 2003 and
to just under 20 per cent by 2008 (TBB, 2003–2008), suggesting less debt-led
risk. Yet the private banks’ ROA ratios have not suffered since the 2001 cri-
sis and have remained in the 2 per cent range rising to a relatively high 2.4
per cent by 2008. The new foreign bank entries have achieved similar lev-
els, with 2008 ROA at 2 per cent and ROE at just over 15 per cent. How is it
possible, when seemingly rather contrary to liberal orthodoxy, that stiffer
regulations at home amidst more aggressive world market competition
can result in higher profits?
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The Turkish state-owned banks are instructive. By the late 1990s, the
state banks had lost their dominant position to the private banks yet ROA
measures remained solid at around 1 per cent. This, too, is during the
1980s and 1990s when the government used the state banks for unpaid
duty losses and as receptacles for several failed private banks. The lat-
ter meant more state bank employees. The handling of more employees
while responding to mandated developmental missions (that had become
neoliberal in orientation since the 1980s) goes some way to explaining his-
torically why state banks had comparatively lower profits than the private
banks. Moreover, while profitability was never the mandated objective
of any state bank, this changed in 2001 when the BSRP mandated prof-
itability as an operational imperative. State bank managers responded by
cutting the number of Halk and Ziraat employees by over 40 per cent
and reducing the number of branches by over 30 per cent. As a result,
the assets managed per state bank employee doubled from $0.7 million
in December 2001 to $1.4 million by August 2003 and the assets handled
per branch nearly doubled from $13.9 million to $26.1 million (BDDK,
2003: 13–14). State bank ROA exploded, reaching 2.2 per cent by 2003
and 2.8 per cent by 2008 without the more risky and debt-based ROE
measures going beyond the 20 to 25 per cent range (TBB, 2004–2008).17
State bank profitability is linked to more intense demands being placed on
workers.
There are important similarities with theMexican banks and how, under
state control during the 1980s, state financial authorities also intensified
the demands placed on bank workers. For one, the PRI encouraged a
parallel system of private market-based financial institutions to compete
with the state banks. At the same time, financial authorities restricted
the growth in state bank branches to merely 0.05 per cent despite the
number of potential bank users increasing by 33.9 per cent between 1982
and 1988.18 This pushed up labor productivity during a period when the
PRI was enforcing real wage reductions for bank workers. When bank
privatizationwas announced in 1990, the bankunionswelcomed it because
of the foregoing decade of state-led austerity and demanded a 100 per
cent wage increase in return for their support for privatization (Weiser,
1990). The 1991 to 1992 bank privatizations did not do much to improve
conditions for bank workers. However, the new bank owners did find
themselves thrust into a highly competitive setting. One response fed on
the past decade of state austerity, and sparked a bankers’ race to capture
hitherto unbanked Mexicans’ savings: the number of bank branches post-
privatization exploded by nearly 36 per cent. The new owners then sliced
the number of bank workers by 13 per cent (OECD, 1998: 187–90).
The pattern remained consistent following the 1995 bank rescue. From
1996 to 2000, the number of new branches expanded by another 12 per
cent as growth in new employees was restricted (OECD, 2004: 304–7). This
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form of intensification delivered remarkable results. Bank owners nearly
doubled worker productivity: whereas in 1994 Mexican banks averaged
29.25 employees per branch this fell to 18.13 per branch by 1998 and to 15.63
by 2000. This level of productivity was maintained in the latest economic
expansionary phase from 2000 to 2007 andwith the entry of foreign banks.
Bank branches grew another 25 per cent, which was matched this time
by employee expansion at just over 25 per cent (CNBV, 2001–2008). Since
2000, ROAgrewmore than two and half times from 0.94 to 2.75; ROE ratios
doubled from 9.69 to 19.93 (CNBV, 2001–2008). According to the Deputy
Governor of the BdeM, Jose´ Sidaoui (2006), the growth in bank profits is
closely tied to reductions in bank employees.
To illustrate that renewed bank profitability is tied to intensified produc-
tivity demands is not to ignore certain other developments in the Mexican
and Turkish banking sectors. Rather, it is to highlight the social relations
of power inherent in banking. To be sure, capital to asset ratios have
improved steadily following crisis and with the entry of foreign bank
capital. Most Mexican and Turkish banks have been in the range of 14
to 16 per cent since 2001 and remain so (IMF, 2009a: 40; TBB, 2009). In
Mexico, foreign banks have also begun to re-enter the mortgage market,
which has seen an expansion in the home property base driven by the state
provider, Infonavit (IMF, 2007b: 25). In both countries, bringing inflation
and interest rates under control has enabled banks to offer longer-term
fixed-rate products thus improving mortgage affordability. In Turkey, the
state-owned Emlak Bank continues to support SMEs. Consumer credit is
also more widely available.
While in individual cases there are some benefits, so too are there some
problems experienced collectively. For one, higher capital adequacy levels
are a reflection of Mexico and Turkey’s continued subordination within
the international hierarchy of states. Financial authorities must ensure the
banks are prepared for volatile conditions in a way high-income coun-
tries like the US or UK typically have not. Greater consumer access to
credit has also come at an extraordinary cost for the average Mexican and
Turk where interest rates far exceed those offered by many of the same
global banks operating in high income countries. Likewise, the entry of
foreign banks has at times contributed to capital adequacy and increased
the availability of credit, but this often comeswith unreasonably high costs
and without the benefit of backward linkages from financial to productive
ventures or from more developed urban areas to poorer rural areas (Eres,
2005; Mannsberger and McBride, 2007; Gu¨ltekin-Karakas¸, 2008; Beck and
Martinez Peria, 2008).
As a structural feature to capitalist development, we see the intensifica-
tion of competitive imperatives in the banking process. Characteristically
of neoliberal class relations, however, intensification has translated into
demanding more from labor. Tendencies towards bank centralization and
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concentration also imply that intensification is also occurring at a larger,
and more powerful, scale.
CONCLUSION
Looking back to early 2009, the G-20 released a Report in the lead up to
its April meeting in London. Titled The Road to the London Summit: The
Plan for Recovery,19 it called on world leaders to make three commitments
to help rescue global economic growth. First, to take whatever action is
necessary to stabilize financial markets and enable families and businesses
to get through the recession. Second, to reform and strengthen the global
financial and economic system to restore confidence and trust. Third, to
put the global economy on track for sustainable growth. Underlying these
commitments rests a cardinal warning: according to US Federal Reserve
Chair Ben Bernanke, any new regulatory reforms must not ‘forfeit the
economic benefits of financial innovation and market discipline’.20 The
‘sacred cows’ of financial policy must not die and the containment of crisis
is not tantamount to a permanent deviation, according to Aslı Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Luis Serve´n (2009: 45).
Sixmonths beyond the LondonG-20 Summit, a full year on from the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers, and despite the world leaders’ strong rhetoric,
many recognize that there have been no structural deviations in financial
regulation and that market discipline endures. This is not to say the res-
cue cum stimulus packages have not been unprecedented and that they
have had no effect. Indeed, the US and European governments have so-
cialized unheard-of quantities of bad private risk and debt, aggressively
rationalized the domestic banking sectors via forced mergers, closures,
and so on, and committed themselves to new heights of internationaliza-
tion, most visibly through the G-20 meetings. In the process of rescue, big
global banks have become bigger through the centralization and concen-
tration of capital. Far frommitigating the competitive imperatives leading
to the 2008–09 crisis, it seems the rescues have intensified the social and
structural conditions amenable to another crisis occurring. Most G-20 gov-
ernments have supported an astonishing rebound in bank profitability by
allowing huge differentials between the central bank base rate and in-
dividual banks’ lending rates. The groundwork for the banks’ return to
profitability was first laid in the wake of crisis by bank managers making
thousands of employees redundant and by closing bank branches. Yet the
G-20 September 2009 meeting in Pittsburgh at best strongly encouraged
bankers to reign in the most profligate bonus structures in order to bolster
capital reserves (and to skirt renewed popular discontent). Regardless of
the fact that the sub-prime crisis precipitated one of the worst economic
recessions in over five decades, structural change has failed and the power
of finance prevails.
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At a conceptual level, we can begin to see that the tendencies of emerg-
ing market bank rescues seen in Mexico and Turkey resonate rather force-
fully with responses to crisis today. We can also begin to see that the
universalization of finance-led neoliberal social rule in institutionally spe-
cific and differentiated forms experienced in Mexico and Turkey’s rescues
also apply today in similar ways. On the one hand, world leaders, national
policy-makers, and IFIs have given more attention than in the past to the
differentiated impacts and responses to the 2008–09 crisis. Case in point
is the historic G-20 call to multilateralism. The IFIs have at the same time
tolerated a range of heterodox responses to crisis unseen for decades. De-
spite the variety of worldwide responses, none to date represent a break
in the social relations of power and class definitive of the current era of
finance-led neoliberalism. Continued dependence on world market flows
of capital, reticence to reign in financial risk, and the strengthening of
the financial apparatus – not to mention ongoing privatizations, massive
lay-offs, the breaking of unions, severe cuts to public services, and the
unwillingness to raise taxes on capital anywhere – instead represent the
deepening social rule of finance-led neoliberal strategies of development.
These strategies remain committed to the withdrawal of popular and po-
litical influence over the flows of capital within national borders and to
protecting the power of finance to offload bad financial risks onto the state
and society in times of crisis.
Put in more general terms, the tendencies of bank rescues are at base
problems of social and class power, institutionalized in different ways ac-
cording to the histories of specific societies. Without managing to account
for the unequal social relations of power underlying aspects of univer-
salization and differentiation, there is little chance policy-makers today
will be able or willing to craft responses that break with this structural
inequality. Stability may come with rescue, but it will come at the expense
of workers, peasants, and popular classes and will be to the benefit of
finance.
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1 ‘World Faces Deepening Crisis, IMF Chief Warns’, IMF Survey Mag-
azine, online, 21 January 2009. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
survey/so/2009/new012109a.htm
2 ‘IMF–OECD–WB Seminar on the Response to the Crisis and Exit Strate-
gies – Joint Statement’, World Bank, online, 4 February 2009. http://web.
worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22069548∼
menuPK:34463∼pagePK:34370∼piPK:34424∼theSitePK:4607,00.html
3 IMF 2009a: 26; ‘WB says Turkey has shock-proof financial system’,Hurriyet on-
line, 14October 2008. http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/08/wall-street-crisis-
ent-fin-cx kw 1008whartonlessons 2.html
4 ‘Learning from Nightmares’, Forbes.com, 10 October 2008. Akc¸aog˘lu, Emin
(1998). Financial Innovation in Turkish Banking, Ankara: Capital Markets
Board.
5 While the dynamics of bank rescue have received relatively little attention, the
bank crises have beenwidely debated (see Akyu¨z and Boratav, 2003; Cizre and
Yeldan, 2005; O¨nis¸, 2006; Garrido, 2005; Guille´n Romo, 2005; Stallings, 2006).
6 While beyond the scope of this article, some have narrowed the Mexican bank
privatization debacle down to whether the prices paid were either high or too
high (for example, Haber, 2005). Others have then reproduced the ‘high versus
too high’ debate as an isolated fact (Avalos and Trillo, 2006: 17; Stallings, 2006:
187). Where circumstances are complex, too direct a line is drawn from the
price paid to the 1995 banking crisis.
7 Ahigh level SHCPdirector in the Banking and SavingUnit affirmed this official
interpretation (Interview, 13 February 2008, Mexico City).
8 In 2002figures,Korea’s 1997 crisis costmore than 20per cent ofGDP,Malaysia’s
1997 crisis 5 per cent, and Thailand’s 1997 meltdown 43 per cent (OECD, 2002:
91). President Barack Obama’s US stimulus package, valued at around 5.7 per
cent of US GDP, seems almost frugal in relative terms.
9 Interview, 27 August 2007, Ankara.
10 Interview, Senior Manager, Halk Bank, 24 August 2007, Istanbul.
11 Interview, Bank and Saving Unit, 13 February 2008.
12 Griffith-Jones et al. (2004) discuss the problems of implementing Basel II for
developing countries.
13 With the 2008–09 financial crisis bringing an end to Turkish economic growth,
AKP President Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an has questioned the principle of TCMB
independence because it ties the hands of government action.
14 For debates on foreign control, see Avalos and Trillo (2006); Beck andMartinez
Peria (2008); Guille´n Romo (2005); and Giro´n (2005).
15 Many others also rightly point to how in emerging markets banks have turned
to acquiring high-yield state debt securities, collecting high transaction com-
missions, driving up user fees for payment services, pushing high interest
consumerdebt, andminimizing loans toproductive activities andSMEs to aug-
ment profitability (Gu¨ltekin-Karakas¸, 2008; Guille´n Romo, 2005; Toporowski,
2007; Stallings, 2006; Lapavitsas and Dos Santos, 2008).
16 Turkish profits are quite robust compared to OECD countries during the 1980s,
for example, 1.38 per cent in Spain, 1.14 in Italy, and 0.5 in Germany (Akc¸aog˘lu,
1998: 92).
17 Comparatively, the 2003 ROA for China’s largely state-owned banking system
was 0.1 per cent and Korea’s largelymixed ownership system’s ROA averaged
0.5 per cent (Stallings, 2006: 69–71).
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19 www.londonsummit.gov.uk
20 ‘The Crisis and the Policy Response’, Stamp Lecture at the London School of
Economics, online, 13 January 2009.
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